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## II.—THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE IN GREEK.

In the preface to the third volume of his *Kunstformen* (p. xxvi), Dr. J. H. H. Schmidt, after enlarging on the benefits to be derived from the study of rhythm and from the study of synonyms, and after anticipating a large accession to classical culture from these two sources, tells us that this culture will ignore the difference between ὥστε with the inf. and ὡστε with the finite verb—a distinction which is due simply to dexterous mental manipulation in the teeth of the facts. It will ignore many other rules of the grammar of the day, but it will have its roots in truth and in life.<sup>1</sup>

Fifteen years have passed since then, and the problems of grammar still exercise the investigator as well as the hapless schoolboy. The practical end of such investigations should be to get rid of these grammatical troubles by sharp and simple formulae, whether positive or negative, in order to give time for the new life that has come, and that is to come, through the study of artistic form, through the study of the thesaurus of antique expression. Much has been done in this direction, much remains to be done; but, in any case, I am opposed to loading the memory of young students with a mass of minute syntactical rules. The formula of my own work for beginners has been for years: "Maximum of Forms, Minimum of Syntax, Early Contact with the Language in Mass." What the young student has to learn in syntax is the necessary differentiation of Latin and Greek from the native tongue. When the form carries the syntax, syntax is needless. When the two horses run side by side, the beginner should be content to ride behind them and not attempt to ride astride them. That feat should be reserved for a later period of syntactical equestrianism. So, for instance, with the general freedom of participle in English and participle in Greek, the study of the latter belongs to style rather than to grammar proper, and, apart from the ascertainment of those principles that simplify the acquisition and the handling of the language, the great attraction of syntactical research in

<sup>1</sup> Diese Cultur wird nicht mehr den Unterschied des ὥστε cum infinitivo und des ὡστε cum verbo finito kennen, den man im grellen Widerspruche mit den Thatsachen herausgeklügelt hat, und so noch viele andere Regeln der heutigen Grammatik; aber sie wird in der Wahrheit und im Leben wurzeln.

Greek lies in the artistic beauty that it reveals. If syntax is not to be made available for the appreciation of form, we need much less of it than we have in our grammars; if it is, as I believe, a potent factor, and, which is more, a measurable factor in style, we know far too little of it; and while the gain from the close study of synonyms will, I grant, be incalculable, still, the results of syntactical research for a like delicate appreciation of idiom are sufficient to encourage the hope that I have more than once expressed—that all syntax may become a *syntaxis ornata*, and that the minute statistic by which we try to replace the effect of native contact with the language may be tributary to the artistic appreciation of the most artistic of literatures—a literature that has been fashioned by processes of which critics of modern written art are just becoming dimly conscious.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Schmidt's selection of *ὥστε* as a specimen of the futility of the approved grammars made a deep impression on me at the time. Every teacher of Greek has to encounter the problem as a practical one. The boy must be taught that there is a difference between *ὥστε* with the ind. and *ὥστε* with the inf., or that there is no difference. If there is a difference, the rule has to be supplemented by the statement that the rule is sometimes asleep with a sleep that resembles death. If there is no difference, then we have to encounter a very marked divergency in the use of the negative—such divergency always recalling a fundamental difference of conception. The only practical solution discernible is to insist on the difference which our own language presents between 'so . . . as' and 'so . . . that,' and to maintain that 'so . . . that' for 'so . . . as' is not a translation of *ὥστε* with the inf., but only an accommodation to more common usage. The English language coincides with the Greek to a certain extent; the differentiation is only one of

<sup>1</sup> See Grammar and Aesthetics, Princeton Review, May, 1883, p. 307. Theodore Watts says: "We believe that the time is not far distant when even such a subject as vowel-composition (the arrangement of one vowel-sound with regard to another) will have to be studied with the care which the Greeks evidently bestowed upon it" (Encyc. Brit., 9 ed., XIX 273). In a remarkable essay on Style in Literature, in the Contemporary Review for April, 1885, p. 548, Robert Louis Stevenson writes of the technic of composition as if he were fresh from the school of Dionysios of Halikarnassos, though the essay bears every mark of independent thought; and, as another illustration of the drift of literary criticism, see an article by E. R. Sill in the Atlantic Monthly for Nov., 1885, p. 673. To those who are familiar with the treatises of the Greek rhetoricians much of our modern aesthetic criticism seems elementary.

more and less. In German the state of things is different. In Latin the state of things is different. German has, so to speak, no *ὥστε* with the infinitive. It uses 'so dass' for both Greek constructions. Latin has no strict equivalent for *ὥστε* with indic., and uses its equivalent for *ὥστε* with inf. (*ut* with subj.) for both Greek constructions. Hence, in these two languages, a certain expenditure of metaphysics, of what Dr. Schmidt calls 'herausklügeln'—an expenditure practically unnecessary in English.

But, of course, it will be said that translation is no proof, and, if it be a proof, that we simply substitute *y* for *x* by putting the so-called English infinitive in the place of the Greek infinitive. Doubtless the difficulties are great, and the student of Greek syntax will be disposed to welcome new light on the subject, whether it come from a closer and sharper consideration of the conditions, or a more methodical and complete array of facts. The most recent treatise that has reached me is the elaborate dissertation of Dr. Seume, which seems to deserve especial mention.<sup>1</sup> Beginning with a summary for my own use, and advancing to an abstract without criticism for the review department of the Journal, I have finally interwoven criticism and suggestion so freely that the article may, perhaps, claim of right the position which it occupies in these pages as a contribution to the discussion of the troublesome consecutive sentence.

The problem is one of those that elude, by their very nature, the grasp of the most determined Proteus-catcher.

The conception of consecution itself, the shifting function of the infinitive, the oscillation of the leading particle *ὥστε*, are enough, single or combined, to perplex the student who tries either the analytical or the historical method, or both. The notion of finality, of will, is plainly set forth in language; the notion of causality lies outside of language, and is a mere inference. The notion of consequence arises in different ways in different languages. Juxtaposition suggests it. Comparison suggests it. Every one who has looked into a Hebrew grammar knows what a momentous part the consecutive relation plays there, and how slight, apparently, is the external indication. In Greek, finality begins it and comparison ends it, and two forms develop—one for tendency, the other for result—and yet, as it would seem, the inference of result is often so irresistible that the mind goes beyond the formal limit and

<sup>1</sup> De sententiis consecutivis Graecis. Scripsit HERMANNUS SEUME. Gottingae, MDCCCLXXXIII.

attaches the notion of result to an expression which commits itself to nothing more than tendency. The English 'so as to' is transmuted into 'so that'; the Latin *ut* with subj. outgoes its potential form, if it be a potential form; the Greek *ὥστε* with inf. produces, at least on some of our best grammarians, an impression hardly to be distinguished from that of *ὥστε* with indic. Thus we import into the combination what does not lie in the elements; but, as that is done everywhere in language, all that the investigator has to show is that our conception of the relation is also the Greek conception. That is all, but that all is a great deal. Between 'so as to' and 'so that' stands, as has been intimated, the warning negative. So long as *μή* continues to keep alive the true infinitive, so long must we recognize the difference between tendency and result—tendency being an outgrowth of finality, result lying at times implied in tendency, yet never coincident with it. If the infinitive is a dative, and a dative only, then the problem is somewhat simplified. Then the infinitive gives the end for which, the personal element which is necessary for final expression fades out, and adaptation is used as harmlessly as a Darwinian uses it, who has no teleology in all his thoughts, though in language, as in human nature, teleology is indefeasible. If, however, there is a local element in the inf., we have a similar trouble to that which arises with the supine in *-u*, which, so far as the form is concerned, may be explained on the theory of the pure dative, the locative, or the pure ablative.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The explanation which refers the supine in *-u* to the dat. (see f. i., Schmalz, §90) has much in its favor, but what right have we to call the clear abl. in Cato and Plautus (§102 Anm. 1) an unsuccessful extension? Why may it not be a survival? Livy has (31, 38) *id dictu quam re facilius*. Concinnity would surely seem to require the same case throughout, although that is not to be insisted on. By the way, Schmalz's excellent treatise gives us no help as to the consecutive sentence in Latin. We read (§285): "Das Consecutive *ut* wird immer mit dem Konj. verbunden; dies kommt daher weil nur durch den Konj. im Nebensatz ausgedrückt werden kann, dass der letztere die Handlung nach den sie begleitenden oder ihr folgenden Umständen bedingt." The subj. is necessary, then, because the subj. alone can show that the dependent clause conditions the action according to the circumstances that attend or follow the action. This is, to my mind, nothing but verbiage for 'contingency.' 'The subj. is necessary because the notion is that of contingency.' In other words, the consecutive sentence does not express fact, but eventuality. The limitations of *qui* with the subj. in a so-called final sense do point to the potential rather than to the final conception, and the potential subj. (= opt. + *av*) does explain the sequence of tenses after *ut* consecutive better than the final,

A still greater complication arises from the introduction of *ὥστε*. It comes in apparently as a reinforcement of the inf. at a time when the inf. is beginning to fade into an acc., just as 'for' in English is introduced to reinforce the fading dat. sense of our supine inf. *ὥστε* with inf. is post-Homeric, and does not belong to the original apparatus; but we should expect to find the germs of the use in Homer, and certainly we should look to Homer for the distinction between *ὥς* and *ὥστε*, on which so much turns. We should look to Homer for the explanation of the remarkable fact that *ὥστε* is normal and *ὥς* abnormal in the consecutive sentence. Unfortunately, the differentiating *τε* is by no means reducible to that homely test of comprehension, that first step to understanding, translation. When *τε* occurs in prose as a copulative particle we know what to do with it. Alone or in couples it is *-que*. 'As'—'so' or 'so (too)' will fairly provide for it. But the force eludes us in *ὅτε* and in *ἄτε*, though *ὅτε* might be rendered 'whenas.' In Homer *τε* is a pervasive trouble. Is it a vocal gesture, a 'there,' a *da*? Does it serve to generalize, as many Homeric scholars maintain, and so set off the particularizing *ἄν*, which in its turn was to become a generalizer in prose? How far down is this generalizing force felt? Was *ὥστε* to Pindar, for example, anything but an old-fashioned *ὥς*? Let us take a familiar form of the problem. What is the difference between *οἶος* and *οἶός τε*? Is it really too elusive to be fixed? George Eliot's 'Theophrastus Such' was a puzzle to those—there are too many—who had not read Theophrastus himself. 'Such' is taken from Theophrastus. Each character of Theophrastus contains in the opening sentence *οἶος*—*e.g.*, *ὁ δὲ περιέργος τοιοῦτός τις οἶος ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι ἀναστὰς ἂ μὴ δυνήσεται*. Can we substitute for this *οἶός τε*? No. *οἶος* has to do with 'character,' *οἶός τε* with 'circumstance' rather; *οἶος* is 'disposition,' *οἶός τε* 'position' merely. A man may be capable of murder (*οἶος*), he may not be in a situation to commit the crime (*οἶός τε*). There are passages that seem to contradict this distinction, long since indicated by Harpokration, who says: *οἶος εἰ σημαίνει τὸ βούλει καὶ προήρησαι, τὸ δὲ οἶός τε εἰ τὸ δύνασαι*. But sometimes emendation is suggested, sometimes 'position' and 'disposition' coincide. If there is any virtue in it, however, it may help us to understand why *ὥστε* is preferred

to say nothing of the negative *non*. Still it is not necessary that *ut* and *qui* should have the same sphere any more than *ὥς* and *ὅς*. *ὥς* final has the subj., *ὅς* final the fut. indic. or the opt. with *ἄν*, and when we look at the teleology that lies in *natus ad*, *accommodatus*, *aptus ad*, we may well pause.

to  $\omega\varsigma$ . It may show that  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is really used to reduce finality to consecution, the adaptation which lies in character being more distinctly final than that which lies in circumstances. But it is high time to turn from the statement of the problem to the summary of Dr. Seume's dissertation. First he surveys the various theories as to  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ : Gayler's  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon = itaque, et ita$ , which he dismisses with contempt as utterly impotent to explain the inf.; Hand's *gleichwie*, which was afterwards modified so as to make  $\tau\epsilon = da$ , in which latter view he has been followed by Wentzel. Hartung makes  $\tau\epsilon = \tau\acute{o}$  and  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon = so dass$ . Klotz identifies  $\tau\epsilon$  with  $\tau\omicron\iota$ ,  $\omega\varsigma$  being  $= ut$ ,  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon = ut quodam modo$ . Years before, G. Hermann had translated  $-\tau\epsilon$  in  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  and the like by *ferme, fere, nimirum*, although he acknowledges an over-translation, Ger. *ja*.  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is *qui omnino, qui quoquo modo rem spectas*. Kvičala makes  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  *der irgend, welcher irgend*, which gradually becomes exaggerated into *quicunque, wer auch immer*, or flattened into an equivalence with the simple  $\omega\varsigma$ . A similar bifurcation is to be expected for  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ ; but while Seume considers the indefinite nature of  $-\tau\epsilon$  to have been made out, he is not disposed to accept the stronger *wie nur immer* signification for the consecutive  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ , which is, as every one knows, post-Homeric, the only two passages in Homer being Il. 9, 42; Od. 17, 21. By the time  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  had got into use as a consecutive particle, the feeling for the  $-\tau\epsilon$  had perished—as it had perished in  $\delta\tau\epsilon$ ,  $\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$  and the like—and  $\omega\varsigma$  and  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  were equivalents. A common-sense conclusion; and yet who will say that  $\delta\tau\epsilon$  might not have been felt as 'whenas'? who will say that there is no difference whatever between  $\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\omicron\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ ? who will explain away the prevalence of  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  over its equivalent  $\omega\varsigma$ ? Strange are the tenacities of language! As for the explanation which despatches  $\delta\varsigma \tau\epsilon$  as equivalent to *et is, atque is*, I must frankly say that it ignores the difficulties that arise from the large use of  $\tau\epsilon$  in other connections, of which a list can be seen in any Homeric lexicon. To call  $\tau\epsilon$  a copulative conjunction only postpones the explanation. Delbrück, who, in his Synt. Forsch. I 51, declines to consider the source of its copulative meaning, in IV 145 leans decidedly to the view that the copulative force is due originally to the correlative use  $\tau\epsilon . . \tau\epsilon$ , and it is certainly remarkable that the double  $\tau\epsilon$  and  $\tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota$  have held their ground better than the single  $\tau\epsilon$ , which had not developed its transitional force in Homeric Greek (Monro, §331). It would carry us too far to inquire into the nexus between demonstrative, relative, inter-

rogative, on the one hand, and indefinite on the other. It is enough to point out that there is no real difficulty in getting the indefinite out of any one of the three, and whether  $\tau\epsilon$  copulative be traced with Hartung to *ta*, a position now generally abandoned, or to *ca*, a position now generally accepted, there is no difficulty about the indefinite or generic sense.

That  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is a comparative particle there can be no doubt. Of course other relative and comparative particles are found in the same general consecutive sense. So  $\delta\varsigma$ ,  $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$  with the finite verb,  $\omicron\iota\delta\varsigma$  with the inf. Still  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  seems to possess a peculiar consecutive force, which it does not share freely with  $\omega\varsigma$ .  $\omega\varsigma$  in the sense of  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is found in Aischylos, in Sophokles, but only once in Euripides (Cycl. 647). Examples enough occur in Herodotos and Xenophon, two 'vagrom men' who are often found straying outside of Attic syntax; but elsewhere in prose we find only sporadic instances (Thuk. 7, 34 and Plat. Menon, 71 A) where it is safer to write  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ . There is no example in Aristophanes, none in the Attic orators, that has not been corrected. In fine, the standard language has settled on  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  as its consecutive, though, according to Seume, there was no difference felt between  $\omega\varsigma$  and  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ . This survival of one especial form is sufficiently familiar, as is also the restriction of a particle to one especial use. Why is  $\omega\varsigma$  temporal used only with the indic.? Clearly on account of its final coloring with subj. and opt. Why has  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  with the opt. in the sense of 'whenever' so narrow a scope? Why do  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  and  $\omega\varsigma$  go up and down like two buckets in different authors? When  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  is 'where,'  $\omega\varsigma$  is 'in order that,' as in Pindar; and so, as I have been informed, in Arrian,<sup>1</sup> who uses  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  as 'where,'  $\omega\varsigma$  comes again to the front as

<sup>1</sup> I append Dr. H. A. Short's statistic of the use of  $\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  and  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  in Arrian, the  $\omega\varsigma$  sentences including tendency as well as purpose:

EMPLOYMENT OF  $\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  AND  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  BY ARRIAN IN CONSECUTIVE AND FINAL CLAUSES, INCLUDING TENDENCY AND AIM.

*$\omega\varsigma$  after Primary Tenses.*

Subjunctive. Present. Anab. 7, 9, 9. Abicht edits optative,  $\epsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$ .—Tact. 37, 3.

Optative. Present. Cyn. 12, 5  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .

Optative. Aorist. Anab. 7, 27, 3  $\omega\varsigma \mu\eta \delta\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha\mu\iota$ .

Optative. Interchange of pres. and aorist. C. Alan. 23.

*$\omega\varsigma$  after Secondary Tenses.*

Optative. Present. Anab. 1, 5, 3; 3, 25, 2 (after historical present); 4, 27, 7 ( $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ); 6, 5, 6 ( $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\mu\pi\acute{\iota}\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\nu$ ); 7, 14, 9 ( $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ); 7, 20, 9; 7, 27, 3.—Per. 17, 3.



final. Of course this limitation to  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  applies only to the standard language. Incidentally Seume remarks that  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon = \epsilon\phi' \phi' \tau\epsilon$  is a false parallel, and that while *ea condicione ut* may give the sense fairly, the only Greek conception is *so . . . wie*, or *so . . . dass*, but surely  $\epsilon\phi' \phi' \tau\epsilon$  ( $\epsilon\phi' \phi'$ ) rests on the same basis, comparative or relative, on which  $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$  . . .  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is built. The conditional element

Optative. Aorist. Anab. (1) cum  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  1, 4, 4; 1, 5, 10; 1, 8, 2; 1, 19, 8; 2, 8, 4; 2, 22, 3; 3, 23, 3; 5, 12, 4; 7, 12, 6; 7, 14, 10. (2) sine  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  3, 23, 9; 5, 24, 8; 7, 26, 1.—Succ. Al. 43.

Subjunctive. Present. Anab. 4, 2, 2; 4, 5, 6 (interchanging with pres. inf.); 6, 5, 6.

Subjunctive. Aorist. Anab. 4, 16, 1  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  (interchanging with pres. inf.).

*$\omega\varsigma$  after both Primary and Secondary Tenses.*

Infinitive. Present. Anab. 1, 5, 6; 1, 6, 6; 1, 25, 9  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 2, 10, 3; 2, 1, 2  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 2, 2, 4; 2, 18, 6  $\mu\acute{\eta}\tau\epsilon$ ; 2, 21, 3; 2, 21, 6; 2, 23, 3; 3, 12, 1; 3, 18, 1; 3, 18, 2; 4, 5, 6  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 4, 6, 2; 4, 16, 1; 4, 21, 2; 4, 21, 3; 4, 21, 5; 4, 21, 6; 5, 7, 5; 5, 9, 2; 5, 9, 3; 5, 15, 4; 5, 15, 5; 5, 16, 1; 5, 22, 5; 5, 23, 6; 5, 25, 3; 6, 3, 2  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 6, 11, 8  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 6, 13, 1; 6, 21, 3; 6, 24, 3; 6, 25, 6  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 6, 27, 4; 6, 28, 6; 7, 9, 2; 7, 17, 5; 7, 29, 4  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 7, 29, 4.—Ind. 2, 4; 9, 2; 13, 12; 32, 9  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .—Succ. Al. 46; 46  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .—C. Alan. 14, 19; 21, 28 (interchanging with the aorist); 29.—Tact. 2, 3; 5, 1; 9, 1; 12, 11.—Cyn. 5, 3; 13, 2  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 13, 3.

Infinitive. Aorist. Anab. 1, 20, 9; 1, 24, 3; 2, 2, 5; 2, 4, 3; 2, 8, 1; 2, 10, 3; 2, 13, 3  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 2, 19, 1; 2, 19, 6; 2, 20, 8  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 3, 9, 2; 3, 15, 4; 3, 18, 4; 3, 30, 4; 4, 15, 3; 5, 15, 5; 5, 16, 1  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 5, 16, 4; 5, 22, 5  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 6, 6, 4  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 6, 19, 3; 6, 20, 2; 6, 21, 3; 6, 29, 11; 7, 9, 1; 7, 12, 4  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ ; 7, 17, 4  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .—Ind. 9, 4; 20, 3; 42, 1; 43, 8.—Parth. 2.—C. Alan. 28, 29  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .—Tact. 17, 4; 25, 8; 26, 4.—Cyn. 10, 2  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ , 21, 2; 25, 2  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .

$\omega\varsigma$  with Future Participle. Anab. 1, 3, 5; 1, 5, 7; 1, 13, 2; 1, 14, 5; 1, 19, 2; 1, 21, 11; 2, 1, 1; 2, 13, 6; 2, 19, 6; 3, 3, 2; 3, 13, 5; 3, 15, 5; 3, 25, 5; 3, 28, 8; 4, 3, 6; 4, 7, 1; 4, 7, 3; 4, 9, 7; 4, 17, 7; 4, 25, 5; 6, 8, 4; 6, 22, 1; 6, 24, 3; 7, 5, 1; 7, 18, 3.—Succ. Al. 44.

$\iota\upsilon\alpha$  is used by Arrian in a local signification (cf. *\iota\upsilon\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho*). The following cases only of  $\iota\upsilon\alpha$  final were met with:

Subjunctive. Present. Anab. 5, 24, 1.

Subjunctive. Aorist. Succ. Al. 40  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .

Optative. Aorist. Anab. 3, 17, 2; 5, 2, 3.—Ind. 15, 5.

Optative. Interchange of pres. opt. and aor. subjunctive. Anab. 1, 14, 7.—Succ. Al. 27  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ .

$\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  Subjunctive. Present. Anab. 2, 14, 6; 6, 4, 3.

$\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  Optative. Present. Anab. 2, 24, 3; 5, 21, 4; 6, 20, 4; 6, 21, 4; 6, 22, 3.

$\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  Optative. Aorist. Anab. 1, 2, 5; 2, 8, 5; 2, 8, 10.

$\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  Pres. Subj. Cyn. 21, 1.

$\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  cum pres. inf. to denote purpose. Cyn. 13, 1.

that we often find in ὥστε and ἐφ' ᾧ carries with it the original finality. Rehdantz, Index, s. v. ὥστε, puts the relation in yet another way: 'ὥστε als Folge hinstellend was eigentlich Bedingung (ἐφ' ᾧ τε) ist.' In my judgment we have to come back to the final in the end. The conditional (restrictive) *ita . . . ut* in Latin has not only *ut non*, but also *ne* (L. G. 556, R. 5, Roby 1650, 1704). The condition is intended to bring about the result. So we often find conditional participle and conditional ὥστε with inf. meeting, but we miss in the participle the clear intimation of purpose, which has to be gathered from the context. Hence we cannot substitute, as has been proposed, *e. g.* by Mr. Ridgeway, ὥστε μὴ οὐ with the inf. for ὥστε μὴ οὐ for the participle, although it must be confessed that the equivalence is close.<sup>1</sup>

## Summary.

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| Interchange of pres. and aor. subj.      | . . . . . | 1  |
| ἵνα Aor. Opt.                            | . . . . . | 3  |
| Interchange of pres. opt. and aor. subj. | . . . . . | 2  |
| Pres. Subj.                              | . . . . . | 1  |
| Aor. Subj.                               | . . . . . | 1  |
| ὅπως Pres. Opt.                          | . . . . . | 5  |
| Aor. Opt.                                | . . . . . | 3  |
| Pres. Subj.                              | . . . . . | 2  |
| ὅπως ἄν Pres. Subj.                      | . . . . . | 1  |

<sup>1</sup> See Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. III, Pt. 1 (p. 40), where, after denying that μὴ in μὴ οὐ with the participle is hypothetical, Mr. Ridgeway goes on to say that it is *consecutive*; the same use of μὴ or μὴ οὐ as with a consecutive infinitive. Inf. = part. is at any time a dangerous equation. The combinations are sometimes equivalent, the processes are different. As a rule the Greek says αἰσχύνομαι ἐπαιτεῖν (ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, Luke 16, 3), but οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι ἐπαιτῶν for evident reasons. That is the natural attitude in the positive, the natural attitude in the negative. 'I am ashamed to beg' = 'Shame keeps me from begging.' 'I am not ashamed while I am begging' = 'I beg without shame.' If we put the propositions in the form of an ideal condition, the difference between inf. and participle vanishes, but that is not due to any equivalence between inf. and participle. It is due to the ideal condition, Xen. Comm. 2, 6, 39: αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἀντιλέγων (= εἰ ἀντιλέγοιμι = ἀντιλέγειν). See Hertlein on Xen. Kyr. 3, 2, 16, who cites also 3, 35; 8, 2, 13; Hell. 6, 5, 44; Plat. Protag. 312 A; and the same on Kyr. 5, 1, 21. But μὴ οὐ with inf. and with partic.

Seume next goes through the various views as to the origin of the consecutive sentence. Schmalfeld's mass of verbiage he gives textually. The only thing worth noticing about this cloud of words is, that with the inf. there is no statement of particular fact, but only of general condition. Kvičala, with his usual acumen, has picked out the final sense of the infinitive as the point to start from, but he makes the 'strong' sense of *ὥστε* the leading sense, and Seume cannot accept this nor yet the final element, although he agrees with Kvičala that we must start with the simple inf. and not with *ὥστε*. Viehoff, on the other hand, starts with *οὕτως* . . . *ὥστε*, which is patterned after *τοιούτος* . . . *οἶος*. But Seume objects that while *τοιούτος* does take the inf. (Od. 7, 309), there is no *οὕτως* with the inf., and that there is no example of the construction of an adverb with the infinitive.

The fact is, the inf. has vitality enough of its own to express finality, adaptation, tendency, and it is found not only with adj. such as *δυνατός*, *ἔτοιμος*, *ικανός*, *ἐπιτήδειος* and the like, but even with colorless *εἰμί*, as in the well-known Homeric passages Il. 9, 688; 13, 312; 24, 489; Od. 22, 106. Sometimes the article is added, but the addition of the article rather changes than shows the conception of the inf., as in So. El. 1079, *τό τε μὴ βλέπειν ἐτόίμα*; Ant. 78, *τὸ δὲ | βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος*. The inf. is still dative enough for such constructions, although it is rapidly turning to an acc., the last end of the deorganized. If you add the acc. article, you at once rouse by

cannot be despatched in a foot-note, and I would only add here that Mr. Ridgeway ought not to have dismissed so cavalierly the suggestion that '*μὴ οὐ* refers to a case which is immediately present.' In the original draught of my article on *μὴ οὐ* for Liddell and Scott, I used the following language, which I have not repented of: 'In these constructions (*μὴ οὐ* with inf. and partic.) the original subj. or ind., while fused with the inf. or partic., asserts, as it were, a separate life. Cf. Lat. *quīn*, which is only half dependent. Hence *μὴ οὐ* generally shows the undesirable or questionable character of the negative result; and in the absence of a translatable difference from *μή*, there is a difference of tone, of personal, practical interest. Still it is necessary to admit the phraseological drift.' And on Hdt. 1, 187: *δεινὸν ἐδόκεε εἶναι μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν*, I remark that *μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν* 'differs from *μή λαβεῖν* only in intimating the personal repugnance to the negative.' Just before, *μή* had been used, but as Dareios warms up we have *μὴ οὐ*. I grant that the hypothetical formula has been done to death. After all, the hypothetical *μή* is only a phase of the will-*μή*, and reversion to the will-*μή* is the safest course when emotion is involved. Still we find *μὴ οὐ* with partic. as an antithesis to a condition in Philemon, fr. 83 (4, 30 Mein.): *οὔτε γὰρ ναυαγός, ἂν μὴ γῆς λάβηται φερόμενος, | οὔποτ' ἂν σώσειεν αὐτὸν οὔτ' ἀνὴρ πένης γεγώς | μὴ οὐ τέχνην μαθὼν δύναται' ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ἔζη τὸν βίον*. And what makes it worse, the *μὴ οὐ μαθὼν* condition is practical.

the contrast the latent dative of the pure inf. and make the difference conscious.

ὥστε was for a long time, and still is to some extent, a favorite particle with commentators for bringing to the consciousness the less usual combinations of the inf. Oddly enough, this very particle is found where, even to our conception, it seems entirely unnecessary, and where the Greek might have dispensed with it. This is the superfluous ὥστε of which the manuals are full—just as we might speak of a superfluous 'to' after 'dare,' a superfluous 'for' with the 'to' of our inf. Of course, 'dare die' and 'dare to die,' and 'ye went out to see' and 'ye went out for to see,' do not produce the same impression, but it would be hard to formulate. In like manner we find the comparative with ἢ ὥστε and the inf.,<sup>1</sup> or with ἢ alone.

Thus far we have seen ὥστε associated with words which could dispense with it. Now, in the form οὕτως . . . ὥστε it extends its sphere, and follows the pattern of τοιοῦτος . . . οἷος. Only, in order to save his consistency as against Viehoff, Seume emphasizes the difference that in the case of τοιοῦτος . . . οἷος the inf. depends directly on the adjective, in the case of οὕτως . . . ὥστε it depends on the quality imparted to verb or adjective. Of course, like all relatives, ὥστε carries its correlative in its bosom, so that we can easily understand why ὥστε is often used alone, though the pair make famous *points d'appui* for the construction of a long period, as every reader of Isokrates knows. Of course the other demonstratives may be used as well as ὥστε.

We now pass from the inf. to the indicative form of the consecutive sentence—from the sentence of tendency to the sentence of result—from the implicit to the explicit. It is really an outgrowth from the ὥστε with inf. form, due to the desire to make the fact more prominent. In making the fact more prominent, the nexus becomes looser and, in the absence of οὕτως, ὥστε really produces the effect of *itaque*. The indicative, thus introduced into the consecutive sentence, is followed by every form of the finite verb—by optative and ἄν, by imperative, by imperative subjunctive, by optative in *oratio obliqua*. In *oratio obliqua* it is sometimes hard to tell whether the inf. is an original inf. or an original indic. According to well established principles ἄν with inf. always represents a finite

<sup>1</sup> Pindar uses ὥστε with the inf. very little; see *Introd. Ess.* cviii. The comp. with ἢ ὥς occurs for the first time O 13, 113, a passage vexed by conjectures. Christ has recently proposed διέμεν.

verb with *ἄν*, but as I have shown elsewhere, the article with the inf. and *ἄν* gives us an abstract form of *oratio obliqua* (Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc. 1878, p. 10; cf. A. J. P. III, p. 197), and so when we find *ὥστε μὴ ἄν* with inf. we have a cross between the tendency form and the result form. The participle after *ὥστε* occurs after verbs of perception in the leading clause, as Dem. 10, 40: *ὁρῶ . . . οὐδ' οὕτως ἀγνώμονα οὐδ' ἄτοπον τῶν ὄντων οὐδένα, ὥστε . . . οὐ φάσκοντα*; really no more difficult than if there had been an inf. after a verb of thinking. So after *ὁρᾶν*, Dem. 3, 1; 61, 3; *γινώσκειν*, Xen. Kyr. 7, 5, 46; *ἐννοεῖν*, Plat. Rpb. 519 A; *φαίνεσθαι*, Isokr. 4, 64; *ἐπιδεικνύναι*, Isai. 9, 16 (cf. Isokr. 4, 21). A few instances occur outside of a verb of perception, as Andok. 4, 20; Dem. 45, 83, so that Klotz, who is followed by Seume, seems to have some justification in making the participle after *ὥστε* an attraction to the participle before *ὥστε*, according to a general law of concinnity. Still it should have been noted that the participle after *ὥστε* is rare, except where we can feel the dependence on the leading verb, so that we do not really need the law of concinnity.

When we come to the next section of Seume's dissertation, 'the rules concerning infinitive and indicative,' we come to the practical difficulty of framing a code for expressions that are naturally shifting. Our English gets between us and the Greek. Our natural *oratio obliqua* form is 'that' and the indic., not the inf., hence the *o. o.* inf. gets a false connotation. We translate the articular inf. very often by 'the fact that' = *τοῦτο ὅτι*, which begs the question. The adaptation of *ὥστε* with inf. is expressed by 'so as to,' but in the interest of easy construction 'so that' with indic. is often preferred, and 'so that' with indic. gives no greater stretch to our linguistic conscience than our translation of *o. o.* inf. In fact, before most people get to Greek their linguistic conscience is seared by Lat. *ut* with subj. All that we can do under this head is to keep, as far as possible, the first coarse renderings apart, to use verbal nouns as much as possible with *ὥστε* and the inf., and to watch the combinations in which *ὥστε* with inf. is preferred, so as to acquire a sensitiveness which the prevalent usage of our own tongue makes it hard to gain. Of the inf. in *oratio obliqua* mention has been made already. Here, whatever the original conception was, the *ὥστε* clause must have the inf., exceptions being rare, as Eur. Tro. 971; Ar. Nub. 1342; Plat. Legg. 3, 692 D.

The inf. is preferred for failure to meet the conditions antecedent. Isokr. 5, 124: *οὐδεὶς τοσοῦτον πεφρόνηκεν ὥστ' ἐπιχειρῆσαι τῆς Ἀσίας ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι κυρίους*, but the indic. can be used, as, after all, the

failure is a fact, and the indic. in the sentence given would only be equiv. to οὐδεὶς ἐπεχέλησεν. 'Breathes there the man with soul so dead, who never to himself hath said,' is a natural English and not an unnatural Greek form, as we can see by many examples both in prose and poetry. In negative statements, then, in questions that expect a negative answer, in conditions, we must look for a prevalence of the inf.; but there is no mechanical rule. In certain phrases, such as εἰς τοῦτο (τοσοῦτον) ἦκει and the like, the indic., with its emphasis of fact, is prevalent, but it is not universal, and it is, of course, subject to the disturbances already indicated, *oratio obliqua*, failure of condition and the like.

As to the tenses of the inf., it is to be expected that the pres. and the aor. will occur in their usual force. The perf. is rare, as the perf. is rare in all inf. constructions outside of *oratio obliqua*. It is rare after verbs of creation, in which it is parallel with the perf. imperative, it is rare in the articular form, and it is rare after πρὶν, which is often equivalent to ὥστε μή. Seume counts about thirty examples of ὥστε with the perf. inf., some of which, however, are virtual presents and ought not to be included. ὥστε with fut. inf. occurs only in *oratio obliqua*, as is shown by the neg. οὐ, when a neg. is used. Elsewhere we must look out for corruption. Hdt. 4, 136 we must read στρατεύσασθαι, and not, with Madvig, στρατεύσεσθαι; 8, 57 we must read, with Krüger, μένειν, not μενέειν. In Xen. Kyr. 5, 5, 30, as there is no *oratio obliqua*, Seume approves of ποιήσειεν in assimilation to the opt. of εἰ θεραπεύσειεν, which is borne out by Oik. 1, 13, the ὥστε clause containing the main thought in both instances. Compare also Isokr. 6, 84, where Bekker, Dindorf and the Zurich editors have ὑπομείναι. Benseler and Blass follow the Urbinas in reading ὑπομείναιμεν. As to the notorious I. A. 417: ὥστε τερφθείης ἰδών, the critics have mumbled it much. ὥς τι τερφθείης, Hermann's emendation, gives us one difficulty instead of another, and perhaps the opt. in an imperative sense (= ὥστε δεῖ σε τερφθῆναι) would be easier than the unlikely sequence after ὥς final, or the use of the opt. as opt. with ἄν.

The use of the finite tenses is free, as we have said. So ὥστε with the fut. ind. is common enough, though it is naturally brought into active competition with the inf. of the other tenses, from which it cannot differ so much as do the other indicatives. Before the future ind. editors often punctuate so as to make ὥστε *itague*.

As to the negatives, οὐ is the regular negative with the indic., μή with the inf. Imper. and subj. take μή according to the rule. μή occurs with the indic. Dem. 19, 218 and 54, 15, where the indic. is really

part of a conditional protasis, as Seume sees. So also in Ps. Dem. Ep. 3, p. 1478, cited by Aken. Isokr. 12, 155 has given some trouble. The passage runs: οὕτως οἶμαι σαφῶς ἐπιδείξειν ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἀνοήτως λακωνίζοντας ἀντεπεῖν δυνήσεσθαι τοῖς ῥηθεῖσι κτέ. Seume thinks that we should have ὥστε μήτε δυνήσονται in *oratio recta*, after the analogy of the fut. indic. after relatives—*e. g.* Dem. 25, 92: τοσοῦτον ἀναθεῖναι τίμημα χρημάτων ὅσον μὴ δυνήσεται φέρειν. Hardly. The negative seems to be due to the leading verb οἶμαι, which occasionally reverts to the μή type. In Soph. Trach. 575, τοῦτο . . . ὥστε does seem to be used as τοῦτο . . . φῖ, but Sophokles often deviates into μή on slight excuse.<sup>1</sup>

οὐ with inf. is due in nearly all instances to *oratio obliqua*,<sup>2</sup> and it is not often necessary to take refuge in adhaerent οὐ, on which too much stress was once laid. Examples of *oratio obliqua* ὥστε were given in a recent number of the Journal.<sup>3</sup> Adhaerent οὐ is

<sup>1</sup> See A. J. P. I 49.

<sup>2</sup> ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κλητήριον | τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε μή τιν' εἰσιδὼν | στέρξει γυναικα κείνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Dyer has demurred to the criticism (A. J. P. VI 523) of his note on Plato's Apology 26 D, where he follows Goodwin's Moods and Tenses 65, 3 in assuming a mixture of two constructions, and has promised to defend his position. Meantime it may be as well to present the evidence as collected by Seume and myself, while silently correcting some of Seume's blunders, as in respect to Lys. 27, 13 and Plat. Gorg. 458 E. It would be a waste of room to cite the examples in full, and I must content myself with the references and the indications of *oratio obliqua*. Hdt. 1, 189 (ἐπηπείλησε), 3, 105 (λέγεται). Thuk. 5, 40, 2 (ῥοντο), 8, 76, 6 (long o. o). Lys. 10, 15 (ἡγοῦμαι), 18, 6 (ἐνόμιζε), 21, 18 (ἡγοῦμαι). Isokr. 12, 255 (φής). Isai. 3, 39 (δοκεῖ), 11, 27 (προσποιεῖται). Aischin. 1, 174 (κατεπαγγέλλεται). Dem. 18, 283 (ἡγεῖ), 19, 152 (ἡγοῖμην), 308 (ἐδημηγόρει). Xen. Hell. 6, 2, 6 (ἔφασαν). Plat. Apol. 26 D (οἶει), Alkib. II 143 D (δοκεῖ), Phileb. 44 C (νενομικόντων), Gorg. 458 E (φής), Euthyd. 305 C (οἰονται), Legg. 7, 806 A (φώμεν), 9, 859 D (ξυνομολογοῦμεν). Adhaerence must be assumed Xen. Hell. 6, 2, 6, where we have οὐκ ἐθέλειν, and in Plat. Apol. 26 D, where we have οὐκ εἰδέναι, but it is unnecessary. In Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 1 it is better to assume a shift from a verb of reflection to a verb of thinking—a very easy shift—than to resort to adhaerence (οὐκ ἂν πολλῶ = ὀλίγῃ ἂν), which is spoiled by the interposition of ἂν, whereas it is natural in Isokr. 8, 107 (οὐ πολλοῖς = ὀλίγοις), Isai. 9, 17 (οὐ πολλαῖς). There is a passage in Lykurgus 3 which it is better to abandon than to defend. The orator has shifted from a conceived δοκεῖ to δοκεῖν, and fervor has done the rest. In Isokr. 5, 4 (οὐδαμῶς ἂν παύσασθαι) the neg. is caused by a preceding νομίζειν, and so in 11, 25 (οὐ διαλύσειν) by a preceding οἶεσθαι, although the infinitive complex would suggest the negative μή. Could there be any more striking evidence of the potency of the *oratio obliqua* element? In fine, Madvig's rule seems to hold thus far, and the few exceptions do not weigh.

to be recognized occasionally, as in Isokr. 8, 107, οὐ πολλοῖς (= δλίγοις) ἔτεσι. Euripid. Phoen. 1357 is explained in this way by Seume, but it will not work, and Lys. 27, 13, which he cites, is not inf., but indic.; and in Plat. Legg. 2, 669 C οὐδ' αὖ belongs not to ὥστε, but to the leading verb, which must be mentally repeated with its clause. In Plato, Theait. 157 A: ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδέν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, we have an illustration of the way in which an intercalated clause switches off a construction, οὐδέν following ἐλέγομεν (cf. Plat. Symp. 183 D). Dem. 40, 22, Seume reads with Baiter and Sauppe, ἐκτένιται, and so effaces the anomaly.

There remains a very small group of passages that have thus far defied the analogist. Dem. 9, 48 it is not necessary to resort to the mechanical expedient of inserting ἦθελον after οὐδέν, or of changing εἶχον into ἔχεν. The inf. after ὥστε is still under the domination of ἀκούω in the preceding clause. Dem 53, 1: οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως ἄπορος ἦν οὐδ' ἄφελος ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐξευρεῖν τὸν ἀπογράφοντα, the imperf. ἦν might fairly be held to be the imperfect of impression ('I seemed to myself'), and so in the antithesis we have ἡγησάμενος.

Eur. Phoen. 1357, already cited, Eur. Hel. 107, and Soph. El. 780, are less manageable. The adhaerent οὐ fails with the first, as we have seen, and anakoluthia's artless aid will hardly help us with any of them. Anakoluthia requires length or strength, length of sentence or strength of passion. Emendation has thus far been tried with only mediocre success. But what are these two or three aberrations in comparison with the consensus of the language?

οὐ μὴ with the finite verb occurs occasionally after ὥστε; ὥστε μὴ οὐ with inf. more frequently. To say that it follows the laws of μὴ οὐ may seem a mockery in view of the discussion that is still kept up about this combination, but that is all for which space can be spared. Professor Schanz and his syntactical society will doubtless ere long give us an exhaustive treatise on ὥστε. Meantime this abstract of Seume's dissertation, with the comments, may be of service to those who desire something more than can be found in the school grammars or even in some larger works.

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